The Unending Iranian Nuclear Crisis

If anybody thought that a change of talk in the Bush administration’s Iran policy would be enough to induce the “isolated” Tehran to give up its intransigence and toe the western line, the July 19 meeting proved him or her wrong. Before the Geneva meeting between Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili and European Union foreign policy chief Javier Solana, the US sent feelers to Tehran. In a clear indication that Washington was prepared to change its belligerent stand towards Tehran, the Bush administration announced that William Burns, undersecretary of state for political affairs, would attend the meet. In addition, unconfirmed reports said the US was planning to open a diplomatic post in Tehran for the first time since relations were severed during the 444-day occupation of the American embassy in Tehran nearly three decades ago.
Iran welcomed the developments and said it was ready for a “comprehensive agreement” with the five-plus-one powers (the US, Britain, France, Russia, China and Germany), which initiated the latest diplomatic push to find a breakthrough to the impasse over the Iranian nuclear issue. However, despite these goodwill gestures, the Geneva talks ended in another deadlock, thanks to the complexities of the proposal the six-power bloc laid down before Iran and the latter’s increasing inflexibility.
The recent diplomatic initiative gained momentum as Solana, along with the representatives of the five countries (excluding the US) visited Tehran on June 14 with the incentive package that offered political and economic benefits to Iran. The proposal offered direct talks between the six-power bloc and Tehran but only if the Islamic Republic stops producing enriched uranium, which can be used to make electricity or fuel bombs. It also asked Iran to freeze further expansion of its enrichment activities for six months as a confidence building measure in return for the international community freezing its efforts to impose more sanctions on Iran during the same period.
Iran has long made it clear that any precondition to the talks is not acceptable. Soon after Solana’s Tehran visit, President Mohammad Ahmadinejad said that his country was open for talks with the US and other powers, but would not change its nuclear policies. According to many analysts, Iran was responding to the West’s carrot-and-stick policy in the same coin. Tehran does not want to send a message to the outside world that it is weak and vulnerable to the American and Israeli pressure tactics. When Israel carried out a major military exercise in June, which many American officials said was a rehearsal for a potential attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities, Iran responded in July with the test-firing of long-range Shahab-3 missiles which can hit Israel. The Islamic Republic has also carried out Prophet Mohammad III war games and reportedly given orders to soldiers to dig 320,000 graves in Iran’s border provinces, in which to bury the bodies of invading soldiers.
General Mohammad Ali Jafari, the head of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, also threatened to block the Strait of Hormuz through which almost 40 per cent of the region’s oil flows, if Iran were attacked. In an apparent move to protect the oil installations in the Gulf in case of emergencies, the US, Britain and Bahrain jointly carried out a naval exercise codenamed ‘Operation Stake Net’. These war preparations and threats were going on at the same time when the Iranian diplomats were preparing a written response to the six-power group’s incentive package. Israeli commentator Uri Avnery calls it “psychological warfare”. He wrote recently that the war games and rhetoric could well be part of the strategies of both sides to increase their bargaining capacity in a possible diplomatic engagement.
Iran also understands the complex dynamics in the region very well. It knows that its former President Mohammad Khatami suspended the country’s nuclear activities owing to the pressure of the West, but gained nothing in return. Unlike the Khatami era, today’s Iran is emerging as a regional power, thanks to the wars that the US and Israel have fought in the last few years. Today, when the US is bogged down in Afghanistan and Iraq and the Hezbollah has emerged more powerful in Lebanon after Israel’s 2006 summer attack, Iran’s regional importance is much higher. Also, record energy prices would force second thoughts before planning an offensive against the world’s second-largest oil producer.
Ahmadinejad’s government has clearly indicated that it is willing for a diplomatic engagement, but not ready to give up the enrichment programme, which is a key bargaining chip in its talks with the West. The fact that Iran did not reject the latest proposal out of hand, like it did two years ago, demonstrates its willingness for talks. Besides, a powerful lobby within the Iranian establishment is increasingly critical of the way Ahmadinejad has handled the nuclear issue. This difference came into open when Ali Akbar Velayati, foreign policy adviser of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, publicly urged the government to accept the European package. In what was seen as an indirect attack on the president, he warned the Iranian leadership not to make provocative statements on the nuclear issue.
So what is the outcome? Ahmadinejad is playing diplomacy without giving up his nuclear intransigence. The two-page note Iran circulated in the July 19 meeting, “The Modality for Comprehensive Negotiations (Non-Paper),” clearly underscores this stand. Iranian diplomats appear to be very cautious and optimistic while talking to the media, in sharp contrast to their president’s public speeches. After the Geneva talks, Saeed Jalili reiterated that his country was ready for a comprehensive agreement with the international community. But Iran’s letter does not address the key demand of the West – ending enrichment activities. Instead, Iran has proposed at least three more meetings with Solana and six more meetings at the foreign ministerial level, which would start with the halting of sanctions against Iran. The New York Times quoted an unnamed diplomatic source saying, “If you were to try to implement it, it would take minimum of several years.”
Europe has asked Iran to respond to the “freeze-to-freeze” proposal in two weeks. Both the US and Britain have threatened more sanctions. Whether Iran would change its policy and accept the “freeze-to-freeze” proposal still remains unclear. Iran appears not to be in a mood to make concessions to the administration of President George Bush, though its quest for a diplomatic solution still remains strong. The two-page response indicates that Iran wants to buy more time, perhaps thinking that a new incumbent in the White House would be more flexible. One also has to wait for the official response of Russia and China, two powers which have resisted harsh sanctions against Iran, to the Geneva meeting. One thing is, however, clear. The Iranian nuclear crisis is unlikely to be resolved any time soon.

(John Stanly, written for IDSA Strategic Comments July 25, 2008)

Iran: Moving towards confrontation?

The Iranian nuclear crisis is unlikely to go quite. It was not long back, the American National Intelligence Estimate said it had “high confidence” that Iran had stopped its nuclear weapon programme in late 2003. This development appeared to have pushed the ‘war talk’ backwards and signalled a somewhat peaceful solution to the controversial nuclear programme. But that did not happen.

With Iran insisting on its “right to enrich uranium” and the West demanding the enrichment be stopped for any further progress in the diplomatic mission, the crisis is again looming large over West Asia. Though European Union foreign policy chief Javier Solana visited Tehran on Jun 14 with a proposal of incentives, not many Iran-watchers think that the latest “diplomatic push” would lead to any breakthrough in the nuclear crisis. Tehran rejects the carrot and stick policy of the West. It says “any precondition is unacceptable”. But the US, on the other hand, has made it clear that the diplomatic mission will take off only if Tehran abandons its enrichment activities.

The US, where Iran is featured in a big way in this election year, is apparently building up pressure on Tehran. The Iranian issue was one of the top agenda of US President George W. Bush when he visited Europe last week. Speaking to reporters in Slovenia after meeting European leaders, Bush said: "Iran with a nuclear weapon would be incredibly dangerous for world peace.” In Germany he seemed tougher. Speaking after holding talks with Chancellor Angela Merkel, Bush said he wanted to pursue diplomacy to deal with Iran’s nuclear programme, but “all options are on the table”.

Bush’s remarks cannot be seen as mere isolated threats of a president, who is in his last months in office. On June 6, Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Shaul Mofaz said military strikes to stop Iran from going nuclear looked “unavoidable”. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, while addressing the AIPAC Policy Conference 2008 on June 3, said the “Iranian threat must be stopped by all possible means”. He emphasized that the economic and political sanctions “are only an initial step”.

Even Senator Barack Obama, the Democratic presidential candidate who earlier proposed to hold direct talks with Tehran, is now echoing President Bush. Speaking to the AIPAC conference, he said he would do “everything in his power” to prevent Iran from going nuclear. So the message is clear. The ‘Iran action plan’, whatever it is, still on the table.

The pressure-building game is on. These all developments indicate that all major powers, the US, Europe and Israel, have resumed discussing different options to deal with Iran. However, Tehran’s response to the European proposal was on expected lines. Iran did not formally reject it, but said its response would depend on how the West reacted to Iran’s May 13 proposal which called for international talks and international inspection of Iran’s nuclear facilities. But it added that the regime would continue to enrich uranium against the wishes of the West. This chilly response seems to have worsened the crisis. Hours after Solana met Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki and handed out the proposal, President Bush, who was in Paris, accused Iran of rejecting the “generous offer out of hand”.

The proposal, according to reports, puts forward a precondition that Iran should stop enrichment. Upon that condition, talks between Iran and six world powers – the US, France, Russia, China, UK and Germany. The six countries “will refrain from any new action in the Security Council,” while Iran “will refrain from any new nuclear activity, including the installation of any new centrifuges”.

However, with Iran rejecting any precondition and the US accusing Tehran of rejecting the proposal itself, the impasse is likely to continue. That Iran did not outrightly reject the offer shows that it wants to buy more time. With the Bush presidency is in its waning days, Tehran hopes that it can hold less conditioned talks with a new administration in Washington. But it remains unclear what would be the immediate move of the western countries if Iran formally rejects the offer. Solana has said the world powers had not reached any agreement on more sanctions against Iran. But President Bush during his European trip managed to win the support of the major European countries for harsher sanctions on Iran if it did not stop enrichment. British Prime Minister Gordon Brown, in a joint press conference with Bush in London, said on June 16 that the European Union would freeze the overseas assets of Iran’s largest commercial bank, Bank Melli. Some reports say a naval embargo of the Persian Gulf or the refusal to supply western technology needed for Iran’s oil industry are also under consideration.

Earlier this month Iranian media reported that the Islamic regime had started transferring billions of dollars from European banks to Asian Banks, and buying gold and equities to protect its oil revenue. This shows that Iran is also preparing to face more economic hardships. However, the big question is that whether Russia and China would support tougher measures, particularly when oil prices are all-time high. But, if Iran rejects the proposal which seeks a diplomatic solution to the crisis, those who argue for tougher measures would get a say. This tone was visible in Bush’s Paris speech. Speaking in a joint press conference with French President Nicolas Sarkozy, Bush said on June 14 that the Iranian response to the proposal was a “clear indication that its leadership was willing to isolate Iranians further”.

The West is unlikely to back off from its key demand: no nuclear enrichment. Iran so far seems to be determined to continue with the enrichment activities. It seems to be sceptical of the promise that the US would cooperate with other world powers to build a nuclear reactor in Iran that would help Iran meet its energy requirements. It has reason to be sceptical of the key western demand that enrichment activities be stopped. Though the previous Iranian president Mohammad Khatami suspended its enrichment activities, it did not lead to any breakthrough.
If both sides continue sticking to their positions, the latest diplomatic initiative will never take off. Rather, the nuclear tussle will lead to an unhealthy confrontation.

John Stanly

Ahmadinejad’s visit - India intensifies global energy game

Iranian President Mohammad Ahmadinejad’s brief but significant visit to India and his cautious criticism against the “bullying” policies of the “rulers of the world” (read the US and its European allies) make one point clear - New Delhi has finally come out of its strategic confusion. When India sent a strong message to the US ahead of the Iranian president’s visit saying the “two ancient civilizations” needed no guidance in dealing with each other, Ahmadinejad, seemingly understanding the sensitivity of India-US ties, did not use the platform in New Delhi to hit out at his “enemies” in the same fashion as he often does in other capitals. This guarded approach from both sides set the stage for broader India-Iran cooperation in the rapidly intensifying global energy game.

New Delhi’s decision to welcome Ahmadinejad must have taken at least a few of India watchers by surprise. It was just two years ago that India, under pressure from Washington, voted twice against the Iranian nuclear programme in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Since then India’s ties with Iran had not been as warm as they used to be. The United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government has often been criticised both at home and abroad for not showing real interest in the proposed India-Pakistan-Iran (IPI) gas pipeline. Besides, bilateral ties between the two countries hit a new low earlier this year as Israel blasted off a spy satellite with the help of India. Iran’s envoy to India even went public criticising New Delhi over the issue.

Then why this turnaround?

This could be seen as part of India’s changing energy policy. According to a recent New York Times report, cosy relations with Iran are important for India at least for three reasons. Iran is India’s second largest oil supplier after Saudi Arabia, is a potential source of natural gas in the future and wields influence in Afghanistan, a gateway for New Delhi to enter Central Asia’s rich oil and gas fields. Still, India had been reluctant to engage Iran, particularly after the US intensified its campaign to isolate the Islamic Republic. The rumours of a possible US attack on Tehran have also pulled India back from going ahead with its ambitious energy plans.
Now, with the US bogged down in Iraq and the possibility of an attack on Tehran looking remote, New Delhi is back on front-foot in the energy game. With oil prices skyrocketing, India does not have many options but to enter into comprehensive energy cooperation with resource-rich countries. The supply-demand mismatch in India has already sent out warning signals across the ruling class.

India, which imports more than two- thirds of its oil needs, fears that the demand would rise by 90 percent by 2030. According to a recent report, India’s average gas supply between April 2007 and January 2008 was 37 million standard cubic metres against the requirement of 77 million standard cubic metres.

This rising demand of oil and gas across the world has already set the stage for a resource war at the global level in which countries like Iran, Saudi Arabia and Russia will become key players. The global scenario demands a tough policy decision from any emerging power like India.
This realisation at the top level was visible when India took another diplomatic U-turn and welcomed the Myanmar military junta’s second most important person, General Maung Aye, earlier this month. Myanmar, with proven gas reserves of 19 trillion cubic feet and vast unexplored areas, could become a potential partner in India’s energy projects.
If External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee said India was against imposing sanctions on Myanmar’s junta ahead of Maung Aye’s visit, it was National Security Advisor M.K. Narayanan’s turn to signal the thaw in India-Iran relations ahead of Ahmadinejad’s visit. Speaking at an international strategic conference in New Delhi, Narayanan said the Iran issue should be handled diplomatically, not with force. This change in Iran policy seems to have come at the right time.
Iran is no longer an isolated, untouchable republic as what the US wants it to be. Its clout is increasing across the Middle East. It has good relations with Iraq and Syria and enjoys the loyalty of Hezbollah, which virtually shattered Israel’s plans in the second Lebanon war in 2006. Tehran extends moral support to the Palestinian Hamas and stands as an inspiration to the political Islamic movements across the region that challenge the cultural and military hegemony of the West.

After all, India must be calculating that a new president in the White House in 2009 January, possibly a Democrat, will have better ties with Tehran than the Bush administration. Besides, Ahmadinejad’s visit would help the UPA government counter the criticisms at home that it was acting as a client state of Washington. The UPA, which is preparing for the next year’s general election, could use the improving India-Iran ties (if it happens) as a barometer of its “independent foreign policy”.

However, the worst is not yet over. Although both Ahmadinejad and India’s Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon expressed optimism over the $7.6-billion IPI pipeline, several questions remain unanswered. Even if the price issue is settled, India’s main concern would be the security of the pipeline. India wants two assurances from Islamabad and Tehran - Pakistan should ensure security to the pipeline, which runs through the troublesome Baloch area, and both Islamabad and Tehran should guarantee the continuous supply of gas irrespective of the political developments in those countries.

New Delhi is also planning another pipeline project aimed at taking out gas from Turkmenistan via Iran and Pakistan to India. Talks about this project took centrestage as the earlier proposed Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) project looked impossible given the security situation in Afghanistan.

Plans galore. But could New Delhi deliver?

It is a tough test for India. It has to draw out policies to meet its energy requirements without antagonising its strategic allies. Relationship with the US remains the top priority of the policy makers in New Delhi. Israel is India’s second largest supplier of defence equipment after Russia. How would India draw out a clear Iran policy without disturbing the existing equations? That is the major test New Delhi faces.

(John Stanly - written for IANS, May 5, 2008)