Post-Mumbai: Will India’s soft-power diplomacy work?

New Delhi, Dec 13 (IANS) Did someone expect a ’stronger’ response from India after the Nov 26-28 terrorist attack on Mumbai?The international media wasted no time in calling it India’s Sep 11, drawing parallels between the Mumbai siege and the terror attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York. US president-elect Barack Obama said India had the “right to defend itself”. Republican Senator John Mccain said in Lahore that India would launch an aerial strike “if Pakistan fails to act against terrorists”.
But, still, the official Indian response was less rhetorical. Those who witnessed the aggressive diplomacy and military mobilisation after the parliament attack of Dec 13, 2001, might have been amused over the way India dealt with Pakistan post-Mumbai.
As The Economist weekly put it, India showed “laudable restraint” and was wary of not attacking the weak civilian government in Pakistan. It, however, painstakingly focussed on the terror cells operating in that country and the support they receive from the Pakistani army and other agencies.
“The Indian government has already alluded to ISI’s (Inter Service Intelligence) support for terror elements operating out of Pakistan. It has built up pressure by postponing composite talks and sharing intelligence with other international spy agencies. This has been carefully done keeping in mind Pakistan’s reluctance to accept any evidence from India,” Ashok K. Behuria, a research fellow and Pakistan expert at the Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), told IANS.
According to Behuria, India’s reluctance to bring in enough pressure on the weak civilian government was perhaps “guided by the reasoning that the government has absolutely no control over the security apparatus”.
“They (India) do not want to create a situation which will bring the (Pakistani) army back on to the centre stage,” he added.
It is worth noting that even after the months-long troops mobilisation (called Operation Parakram) following the parliament attack, India gained nothing great, neither diplomatically nor militarily. Though the Musharraf government banned the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) in January 2002, the terror outfit continued to enjoy the support of Pakistan’s notorious spy agency.
When the governments in the Middle East and East Asia took strong measures to crack down on the terror groups operating in their territories, LeT “flourished” in Pakistan with the help of ISI and a huge fund-raising organisation, Jamat-ud-Dawa, the New York Times reported recently, quoting unnamed American intelligence officials.
The Mumbai terror attacks took place against this background. Any policy level decision from India should have taken at least two things into consideration - the widening chasm between the army and the civilian government in Pakistan and a growing LeT that enjoys the support of the security establishment.
Any use of the hard power would have brought the Pakistani army back on to the centre stage. Carefully avoiding that, India adopted a realistic approach to win international support to force Pakistan to act against the militants.
“I am making it quite clear that it (war) is not a solution,” External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee told parliament Thursday, adding “controllers of Mumbai attacks were in Pakistan. Islamabad should act against them.”
The post-Mumbai situation is providing an opportunity to New Delhi to test its soft power at the international level. It is a major crisis the country is facing after cementing its strategic tie-up with the US through the civilian nuclear deal.
Could New Delhi use this “strategic advantage” effectively to force Pakistan act?
Pakistan has reportedly cracked down on the Jamaat-ud-Dawa’s office in Muzaffarabad and placed restrictions on the movement of many militant leaders, including Maulana Masood Azhar of Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), LeT’s founder leader Hafiz Muhammed Saeed and its operational level head Zaki ur-Rehman Lakhvi.
Given the futility of similar detentions of militant leaders following the parliament attack and the 2006 Mumbai train bombing, India has reasons to remain sceptical. Mukherjee made the position clear while asking Pakistan to act. “Mere expression of intention is not adequate.”
India wants Pakistan to destroy the terror cells operating in its territory. That is where the soft-power diplomacy faces its real test. Is it realistic to expect the Pakistani army, which gives overt support to anti-India militants, to take military action against them? Could the civilian government that has little muscle go against the wishes of the military?
These questions remain to be answered. But India’s delicate engagement has made advances on two fronts - it denied the Pakistani army that is bogged down in a dirty war in the Afghan border an opportunity to come back to the eastern border and it brought the civilian government directly under severe international pressure.
Now Pakistan has to find a way out. If not, as Mukherjee said, it will not be “business as usual” for that country.
(John Stanly, written for IANS, December 13, 2008)

Cracks begin to appear in the US-Pakistan alliance

The June 10 cross border attack by American F-15E fighter bombers on Pakistani paramilitary troops is the latest indication of the changing dynamics of the much discussed US-Pakistani alliance against terrorism.

The attack took place in Mohmand, a dangerous border area, part of Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). The US version of the story is simple. Taliban fighters from Mohmand crossed into the Afghan border and unleashed attacks on the coalition troops with rocket-propelled grenade fire. The international troops returned fire and drove the militants back into Pakistan. Then, three US fighter planes crossed the border and dropped about a dozen bombs. The US expressed regrets over the incident. State Department spokesman Gonzalo Gallegos told reporters in Washington that the incident was a reminder that “better cross border communications between forces is vital”.

Is that all? This is not the first time the US jets cross the border and bomb Pakistani people. In March, an American aircraft dropped bombs in South Waziristan, haven of the militants, killing nine people. Similar incidents had occurred in January also. The latest attack comes at a crucial time when the Pakistani government is negotiating a deal with the militants in the borderland, a move that irked the US and its European allies. The change in Islamabad’s counter terrorism strategy, according to many analysts, shook the foundations of the so-called anti-terror alliance between Pakistan and the US.

Islamabad’s response to the Mohmand attack underscored this perception. When Pakistani Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gillani denounced the attack as an affront to the country’s “sovereignty, dignity and self-respect” the military’s response was more stunning. The US attack “hit at the very basis of co-operation and sacrifice with which Pakistani soldiers are supporting the coalition in the war against terror”, said a military spokesman. The act was “absolutely unprovoked and cowardly”, he added. The strong response of the Pakistan army makes one thing clear: army has completely moved away from President Pervez Musharraf’s grip. There’s a strong perception in Pakistan, even within its army, that the so-called anti-terror campaign in Waziristan and other border regions is being fought at the behest of the US.

The civilian government appears to hold this view. It says many of the tribal leaders now support the Taliban because of the relentless military raids in the borderland. The government thinks a peace deal with the militants would help it limit their influence within the border districts. However, this policy shift comes at the expense of the US’ interests in South Asia. Holding talks with militants is an anti-thesis to the so-called Bush doctrine, which calls for “eradicating” terror cells through military campaigns. Besides, it undermined Bush’s plan to make headway in its anti-terror campaign in the tribal area before he leaves office by the end of this year.

The frustration was visible as the US many times went public against the Pakistan government in the past three months. NATO, citing figures, stated that there were more cross-border attacks against the coalition troops in Afghanistan in May 2008 comparing to the year-ago period. It added that the peace talks and Pakistani government’s plan to downsize troops in the border region would backfire as the militants were regrouping themselves. The US has also complained that it does not get any military support from Pakistan to continue the fight against Taliban. The Mohmand attack took place against this background. Given the recent developments in the bilateral ties, the bombing is expected to make things more complicated for both sides.

When the Damadola missile attack took place Oct 29, 2006, the Pakistani army suddenly took the responsibility of the attack and actively resisted any attempt to link the US with the incident. The attack on Damadola religious seminary, which killed 82 people, incidentally took place on the same day the provincial government was supposed to sign the Bajour Accord with the local tribes. Many reports at that time claimed that the US, which was opposed to the deal, was behind the attack. But now the scene is different. Both the federal government and army are unlikely to defend the US if any such incident occurs. But, at the same time, many Pakistan-watchers think the US may go to any extend to stop a possible deal with the militants.
It is not yet clear whether the peace talks would bring in any result. Even the Pakistani government’s counter terror strategy looks vague. But, Islamabad seems to be determined to honour its pledges to break with the Musharraf regime. Of course, a bad news for the Americans.

(John Stanly)

Afghanistan Steps Deeper into Security Quagmire

The attempt on President Hamid Karzai's life in the heart of the capital city of Kabul by suspected Taliban militants underscores the growing pessimism about security in the country. If the April 27 attack is anything to go by, Taliban militants are increasing their influence all across the country. Soon after the attack, the Taliban claimed responsibility saying its aim was to show that it could strike from the capital. The message is clear - the Taliban has reached the capital.It was not long ago that US President George W. Bush pledged to "smoke" the terrorists "out of their holes" in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan. However, almost seven years after he declared a war on terrorism, Taliban militants, once driven out of Kabul by the US with the help of the Northern Alliance, have shown that they can carry out a well-coordinated attack even against the president in his turf.Given the security situation and the incompetence of the Karzai regime, the latest attack is unlikely to take anybody by surprise. Critics of the US' Afghan invasion long ago warned that Washington could not win over the Taliban with its muscle power.Even after seven years of counter-insurgency operations with perhaps the most sophisticated weapons, the Afghan government and its "international allies" are still struggling to ensure security to the citizens staying outside Kabul. Acute poverty and security threats from the Taliban have forced the citizens, mostly in the south, to shift their loyalty to the insurgents. The government's failure to reach out to the people and take care of their basic needs has driven the Afghans away from Kabul, which is largely perceived as a puppet establishment of Washington.According to the United Nations, 78 of 376 districts in the country are Taliban strongholds where the government's security apparatus is totally non-functional. Government officials agree that there is a growing gap between the government and the people that is being exploited by the Taliban. The government is unable to even carry out reconstruction work in the south as Taliban militants frequently attack government forces and often kidnap aid workers.The Kabul attack shows that the militants are no longer hiding in their "holes" in the Tora Bora Mountains waiting for their opportunity to strike against the foreign troops. They are out in the streets, targeting the supporters and the top leadership of the government - the same strategy the militants used against the Soviet troops in the 1980s. If they succeed in creating a permanent internal security threat among the citizens, they would have won the first part of the battle.This poses serious doubts about the counter-insurgency strategy of the NATO-led international troops. Last year, more than 8,000 people died in violence related to insurgency, and there were 160 suicide attacks. Kabul, where a large number of international troops are stationed, has been considered relatively calm since the American invasion. However, with the latest attack, the militants have shattered the security claims of the government. The ability of the militants to get so close to Karzai with weapons shows that they had inside help.The growing concern over the failure of the Afghan strategy was visible when Uzbekistan President Islam Karimov made it clear at the recent NATO summit in Bucharest that NATO alone could not ensure security in Afghanistan. According to him, apart from the NATO and the US, major powers like China and Russia and also the Central Asian republics should be allowed to play a larger role in Afghanistan. It however still remains unclear whether the US would be ready for a realignment of troops in Afghanistan. Russia, on the other side, has so far been reluctant to get involved in Afghanistan though it has strong interests in Central Asia.A paradigm shift in the western governments' Afghan policy is inevitable, as the situation gets worse day by day. It is already clear that the puppet government in Kabul, even with the support of the international troops, is not capable of quelling the insurgency. The rise of Sunni Islamists in Afghanistan is in nobody's interest. To prevent such a catastrophe, the international community should ensure wider cooperation and consider all possible options.

(John Stanly; written for Indo-Asian News Service (IANS) April 30, 2008)